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Support for Resistance: 
Technical Analysis and 
Intraday Exchange Rates
arly in the morning of each business day, the major foreign
 exchange trading firms send their customers lists of 
technical trading signals for that day. Timely technical signals 
are also supplied by major real-time information providers.  
These signals, which are based primarily on prior price and 
volume movements, are widely used by active foreign exchange 
market participants for speculation and for timing their 
nonspeculative currency transactions. In fact, 25 to 30 percent 
of foreign exchange traders base most of their trades on 
technical trading signals (Cheung and Chinn 1999; Cheung 
and Wong 1999).  More broadly, technical analysis is used as 
either a primary or secondary source of trading information by 
more than 90 percent of foreign exchange market participants 
in London (Allen and Taylor 1992) and Hong Kong (Lui and 
Mole 1998).
The technical trading signals provided to customers vary 
over time and across technical analysts, but the vast majority of 
the daily technical reports include “support” and “resistance” 
levels.  According to technical analysts, support and resistance 
levels are points at which an exchange rate trend is likely to stop 
and may be reversed.  For example, a firm publishing a support 
level of $1.50/£ would claim that the dollar-pound exchange 
rate is likely to stop falling if it reaches $1.50/£.  If the firm also 
provided another support level of $1.45/£, the firm would 
claim that if the exchange rate passes through $1.50/£, it is 
likely to stop falling at $1.45/£.
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• Among the technical trading signals supplied 
to customers by foreign exchange trading 
firms are “support” and “resistance” levels. 
These levels indicate points at which an 
exchange rate trend is likely to be 
interrupted or reversed.
• A rigorous test of the levels specified by six 
trading firms during the 1996-98 period 
reveals that these signals were quite 
successful in predicting intraday trend 
interruptions.
• Although all six firms were able to identify 
turning points in exchange rate trends, some 
firms performed markedly better than others. 
As a group, the firms predicted turning points 
in the dollar-yen and dollar-pound exchange 
rates more accurately than turning points in 
the dollar-mark exchange rate.
• In addition, the predictive power of the 
support and resistance levels appeared to 
last at least five business days after they 
were first communicated to customers.
Carol Osler
E54 Support for Resistance
Despite the almost universal use of support and resistance 
levels in short-term exchange rate forecasting, the ability of 
these trading signals to predict intraday trend interruptions has 
never been rigorously evaluated. This article undertakes such a 
test, using actual support and resistance levels published daily 
by six firms from January 1996 through March 1998. The firms 
include commercial banks, investment banks, and real-time 
information providers based in the United States and abroad. I 
examine the value of three currencies relative to the U.S. dollar: 
the German mark, the Japanese yen, and the British pound. 
Support and resistance levels for these exchange rates are tested 
against indicative exchange rate quotes sampled at one-minute 
intervals between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. New York time. 
These tests strongly support the claim that support and 
resistance levels help predict intraday trend interruptions for 
exchange rates. All six of the firms studied were able to identify 
points where intraday trends were likely to end. However, some 
firms were better than others at identifying such points.
For most firms, the predictive power of support and 
resistance levels lasted at least five business days beyond the 
levels’ publication date. Despite their overall success at 
identifying points of trend interruptions, none of the firms 
correctly assessed the relative likelihood of trend interruptions 
at the different levels. These results are consistent across firms 
and are sustained over a number of sensitivity analyses.
The statistical tests are based on the bootstrap technique 
(Efron 1979, 1982), a nonparametric method frequently used 
to evaluate technical trading strategies (Brock et al. 1992; 
Levich and Thomas 1993). To implement the tests, I compare 
the behavior of exchange rates upon reaching published 
support and resistance levels with the behavior upon reaching 
10,000 sets of arbitrarily chosen support and resistance levels. 
If the outcome associated with the actual levels exceeds the 
average outcome for the arbitrary levels in a high proportion of 
months, I conclude that the published levels have significant 
predictive power.
To complement the analysis of these signals’ predictive 
power, I also analyze the signals themselves. I show that 
support and resistance levels provided by individual firms tend 
to be fairly stable from day to day. Their range varies very little 
over time. Firms do not agree extensively with each other on 
the relevant signals.
The specific conclusion that exchange rates tend to stop 
trending at support and resistance levels has no precedent in 
the academic literature. The closest point of comparison is a 
study by Lo et al. (2000), which finds that the conditional 
distribution of financial prices is sensitive to the presence of a 
broad variety of technical trading signals, consistent with the 
results presented here.
The finding that support and resistance levels are able to 
predict trend interruptions is consistent with other studies of 
the usefulness of technical trading rules when applied to 
currencies. Filter rules were found to be profitable as early as 
1984 (Dooley and Shafer 1984), less than a decade into the 
floating rate period, and this finding has been confirmed 
repeatedly (Sweeney 1986; Levich and Thomas 1993). Moving-
average crossover rules have also been tested frequently on 
exchange rates, with similar results (Levich and Thomas 1993; 
Menkhoff and Schlumberger 1995). More recently, Chang and 
Osler (1998) find that a trading strategy based on the head-
and-shoulders chart pattern is profitable for dollar exchange 
rates vis-à-vis the mark and the yen, although not for four other 
dollar exchange rates.
This study differs from those earlier studies in four notable 
ways. First, the technical trading signals used here are intended 
to anticipate trend reversals, rather than trend continuations. 
Second, this study uses a type of trading signal that is actively 
used by market participants. Third, it uses trading signals that 
were produced by market participants. Other academic studies 
of technical analysis have typically constructed technical 
trading signals of their own. Finally, this study uses data 
sampled at one-minute intervals throughout the New York 
trading day, while most earlier studies have used data sampled 
at daily or lower frequencies.
The two existing studies of support and resistance levels—
Curcio et al. (1997) and Brock et al. (1992)—test the hypothesis 
that prices tend to move rapidly once the levels are breached. 
Curcio et al. find that the hypothesis is not true on average for 
currencies, but may hold true during periods of strong 
trending. Brock et al. find that the hypothesis is true for daily 
movements of the S&P 500 stock index, but the profits may not 
be sufficient to offset transaction costs. The hypothesis that 
prices will trend once a trading signal is breached is not unique 
to support and resistance levels and is not examined here.
Despite the almost universal use of support 
and resistance levels in short-term 
exchange rate forecasting, the ability of 
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Technical Analysis 
Technical analysts claim that they can predict financial price 
movements using an information set limited to a few variables, 
such as past prices. Many of the major technical indicators were 
described as early as 1930 by Shabacker, who based his 
conclusions on observations of U.S. stock prices. By now, 
technical indicators are widely used in major financial markets 
around the world, including foreign exchange and futures 
markets. There are two magazines devoted exclusively to the 
topic, each of which has more than 40,000 subscribers. To learn 
about technical analysis, one can consult myriad manuals, 
software, and on-line sources. Alternatively, one can take 
courses on technical analysis.
Casual observation and conversations with market 
participants indicate that support and resistance levels are the 
most widely used technical indicators in the foreign exchange 
market. This conclusion is also suggested by the fact that 
support and resistance levels are the only indicators provided 
by all six of the technical services covered in this research. In 
fact, some services provide no technical indicators at all other 
than support and resistance levels.
Support and Resistance Levels Defined
Before delving further into the analysis, it is important to 
explore the definition of support and resistance levels provided 
by technical analysts themselves. According to one major 
technical analysis manual, “support is a level or area on the 
chart under the market where buying interest is sufficiently 
strong to overcome selling pressure. As a result, a decline is 
halted and prices turn back again. . . . Resistance is the opposite 
of support” (Murphy 1986, p. 59). 
A review of technical analysis manuals reveals that there is 
little disagreement among analysts on this definition (Arnold 
1993; Edwards and Magee 1997; Hardy 1978; Kaufman 1978; 
Murphy 1986; Pring 1991; Sklarew 1980). For example, Pring  
states: “Support and resistance represent a concentration of 
demand and supply sufficient to halt a price move at least 
temporarily” (p. 199). Likewise, Arnold (1993) observes: “A 
support level is a price level at which sufficient demand exists 
to at least temporarily halt a downward movement in prices” 
(p. 67).1
To identify the support and resistance levels relevant for the 
coming day, practicing technical analysts consult a variety of 
information inputs. These include visual assessments of recent 
price performance, simple numerical rules based on recent 
price performance, inference based on knowledge about order 
flow, and market psychology.
The simplest approach to visual assessment is to look at 
recent minima and maxima: “Usually, a support level is 
identified beforehand by a previous reaction low,” and “a 
resistance level is identified by a previous peak” (Murphy 
1986, p. 59). According to Pring (1991), one could also 
identify support and resistance levels by drawing a trendline, 
or “channel,” in which recent peaks are connected by one line 
and recent troughs are connected by another: “A good 
trendline represents an important support and resistance 
zone” (p. 105).
One numerical rule used to infer support and resistance 
levels is the “50 percent rule,” which asserts that a major market 
move will often be reversed by about 50 percent in the first 
major correction (Pring, p. 187). Fibonacci series, which are 
widely used, suggest that 38.2 percent and 61.8 percent 
retracements of recent rises or declines are common.
Market insiders sometimes identify support and resistance 
levels using private information or information circulated 
informally in the market about certain market participants. For 
example, if a technical analyst learned in conversation that 
Japanese exporters are selling at 100, he or she would report a 
resistance level at ¥100.00/$. Similarly, if a trader knew that his 
or her own firm had a large order at DM1.50/$, he or she might 
expect unusual price behavior at that point.
Simple market psychology is also used to help identify 
support and resistance levels. According to Murphy (1986): 
“Traders tend to think in terms of important round 
numbers . . . as price objectives and act accordingly. These 
round numbers, therefore, will often act as psychological 
support or resistance levels.” As I will demonstrate later, 
published support and resistance levels are round numbers 
that end in 0 or 5 much more often than they would if they 
were chosen at random.
Some of the firms in the sample provided explanations 
for their chosen support and resistance levels. All of the 
approaches listed above are well represented among those 
explanations.
To identify the support and resistance 
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practicing technical analysts consult a 
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Properties of the Support and Resistance 
Database
The data examined here include support and resistance levels 
for the mark, yen, and pound in relation to the U.S. dollar, 
published daily by six firms from January 1996 through 
March 1998. Two of the firms did not report support and 
resistance levels for the pound. In total, there are approximately 
23,700 support and resistance values (combined) for the mark, 
22,800 for the yen, and 17,700 for the pound.
The six providers of technical analysis include commercial 
banks, investment banks, and news services. Some operate in 
the United States and others operate abroad. The commercial 
and investment banks provide the information free of charge to 
their customers, hoping that customers will be encouraged to 
direct more business toward them. Some news services charge 
for the information. Since all the providers hope that the 
usefulness of their signals will generate additional business, 
they have every incentive to maximize accuracy. In the analysis 
that follows, the firms are assigned numbers to preserve 
anonymity.
On any given day, technical indicators were likely to be 
received from about five of the six firms. Firms failed to report 
for reasons such as vacations, sickness, and equipment 
problems. For individual firms, the average number of support 
and resistance levels (combined) that were listed per reporting 
day per currency ranges from two to eighteen (Table 1).
The support and resistance levels were quite close together 
for some firms and quite far apart for others. As shown in 
Table 2, the average distance between levels varied from 
30 to 162 points on average (where a point is the smallest unit 
used in quoting an exchange rate).
Table 1









1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
3 17.8 18.1 18.0 17.5
4 9.0 9.2 8.8 —
5 4.2 4.8 3.8 4.0
6 2.5 2.7 2.3 —
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 2
Average Distance between Support 








1 3 03 62 92 6
2 6 17 55 25 5
3 5 45 84 95 4
4 5 76 44 9—
5 162 156 184 144
6 4 24 73 6—
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Distances are measured in points, or 0.0001 marks/dollar, 0.01 yen/
dollar, and 0.0001 dollars/pound.
Table 3
Average Gap between Current Spot Rates and 








1 3.45 2.56 2.38
2 3.71 2.38 2.63
3 8.32 6.73 7.15
4 5.52 3.79 —
5 4.96 5.13 4.52
6 1.24 0.74 —
Daily ranges 









Note: Distances are measured in units of 100 points, or 0.01 marks/dollar, 
1.0 yen/dollar, and 0.01 dollars/pound.
The data examined here include support 
and resistance levels for the mark, yen, and 
pound in relation to the U.S. dollar, 
published daily by six firms from January 
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Firms also varied dramatically in the range over which they 
chose to present support and resistance levels applicable to a 
given day (Table 3). For Firm 6, the outermost support and 
resistance levels were typically only about 100 points away from 
current spot rates, while for Firm 3 the outermost support and 
resistance levels were typically more than 700 points away. The 
final two rows of the table show the average and maximum 
daily exchange rate moves away from their opening rates over 
the period. For all firms, the outermost support and resistance 
levels were substantially farther away from the opening rates 
than this average move. The correlation between daily 
exchange rate ranges and the gap between opening rates and 
outermost support and resistance levels was not statistically 
significant for any firm-currency pair.
Use of Round Numbers
More than 70 percent of the support and resistance levels in the 
sample end in 0, and a full 96 percent end in either 0 or 5 
(Table 4). These proportions greatly exceed the proportions we 
would observe if levels were chosen randomly, which would be 
10 or 20 percent, respectively. Levels ending in 00 or 50 were 
also disproportionately represented. This may be a mani-
festation of the psychological interpretation of support and 
resistance levels mentioned earlier. It is interesting to note that 
Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) observed that round numbers 
were also disproportionately represented in bid-ask spreads for 
major currencies.
Continuity
To analyze the extent to which support and resistance levels 
published by a given firm vary from day to day, I counted the 
number of support and resistance levels shared across days for 
a given firm, and compared it with the maximum number of 
levels that could have been shared. That maximum depends on 
the number of support and resistance levels provided on the 
two days: if the firm provided three support levels on the first 
day and four on the second day, the number of shared support 
levels, or matches, could not possibly exceed three. The 
maximum number also depends on the size of the exchange 
rate move from the first to the second day: if the exchange rate 
falls substantially between days one and two, then some of the 
support levels provided on day one might be irrelevant on day 
two. A shared level, or “match,” was defined as a pair of 
support and resistance levels on contiguous days that differed 
by less than 5 points.
On average, about three-quarters of the still-applicable 
support and resistance levels from one day would be used again 
the next day (Table 5). This average masks a clear division of 
Table 4
Support and Resistance Levels Ending 
in Round Numbers
Percent
Support and Resistance Levels Ending in
00 00 or 50  0 0 or 5 
Natural 
 frequency 1.0 2.0 10.0 20.0
Firm 1 12.1 17.9 65.8 96.3
Firm 2 13.2 22.4 58.1 84.4
Firm 3 12.5 16.8 82.4 96.6
Firm 4 7.8 15.7 52.9 92.2
Firm 5 49.4 66.4 97.1 99.4
Firm 6 22.9 42.9 74.3 100.0
All firms 13.5 19.6 70.1 95.5
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 5








1 64.4 62.4 62.9 67.9
2 54.0 51.0 56.2 54.5
3 91.4 89.8 91.7 92.6
4 81.9 81.2 82.7 —
5 80.8 77.5 85.0 81.3
6 56.5 56.0 57.4 —
All firms 77.8 76.5 78.2 79.1
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The table shows the percentage of support and resistance levels 
shared across adjacent days. A pair of levels on adjacent days is defined as 
shared if the levels differ by at most 5 points. Numbers for firms showing 
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the firms into two groups. Firms 3, 4, and 5 showed the 
strongest continuity: more than three-quarters of their still-
applicable support and resistance levels were used again the 
next day. For the remaining three firms, the corresponding 
proportions were lower, ranging from about one-half to two-
thirds. These results do not change qualitatively if a match is 
defined as two levels within 2 points of each other.
Agreement across Firms
Firms do not agree extensively on the relevant support and 
resistance levels for a given day. To examine the extent of 
agreement across firms, I first counted the number of matches 
across each of the fifteen pairs of firms. For each day, the 
number of actual matches was then compared with the number 
of possible matches for that day. For a given day, the number 
of possible matches among support (resistance) levels was 
taken to be the minimum number of support (resistance) levels 
provided across the two firms.
On average, roughly 30 percent of all possible matches were 
realized as actual matches under the basic definition of a match 
(a maximum difference of 5 points), as shown in Table 6. 
Across firm pairs, the frequency of agreement varied from 
13 to 38 percent (Table 7). Firm 5 stands out as the least likely 
to agree with its peers. Firms 1 and 2 stand out as agreeing 
particularly frequently with each other. Among the other firms, 
no strong patterns are distinguishable. 
If a match is defined as two levels within 2 points of each 
other, then roughly 18 percent of possible matches are actually 
realized. The same Firm 5 still stands out as the least likely to 
agree with its peers; the only strong agreement appears to be 
between Firms 3 and 6.2
Exchange Rate Data 
and Methodology
This section presents the exchange rate data, some important 
definitions, and the statistical methodology used to test the 
ability of support and resistance levels to predict intraday trend 
interruptions. 
Exchange Rate Data
The exchange rate data comprise indicative bid-ask rates 
posted on Reuters, captured at one-minute intervals from 
9 a.m. to 4 p.m. New York time. The prices for a given minute 
were taken to be the last quote made prior to that minute.
Table 6









Average possible matches   
per day 112.0 47.9 43.0 21.1
Average actual matches 
per day 33.5 14.3 12.3 6.9
Average actual matches 
per day as a percentage 
of possible matches  29.9 29.9 28.6 32.7
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The table shows the number of times all firms’ support and 
resistance levels actually match as a percentage of the total number of 
possible matches. A match is defined as a pair of support and resistance 
levels that differ by at most 5 points. 
Table 7
Pairwise Agreement across Firms on Support 
and Resistance Levels 
All Currencies
Firm
F i r m 2 345
1 38 33 27 17
23 5 3 1 13




Notes: The table shows the number of times a pair of firms’ support 
and resistance levels actually match as a percentage of the number of 
possible matches. A match is defined as a pair of support and resistance 
levels that differ by at most 5 points. Numbers representing firm pairs for 
which agreement falls at or below 23 percent (mean overall agreement 
of 30 percent minus one standard deviation) are in bold. The italicized 
number represents firm pairs for which agreement falls at or above 
37 percent (mean overall agreement of 30 percent plus one 
standard deviation).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 59
Exchange rate
Hypothetical Exchange Rate Paths 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Support
A “hit” if rate 
crosses support +
0.01 percent
A “bounce” if rate
is greater than 
support after 
fifteen minutes




The analysis in Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) suggests 
that these indicative quotes are likely to correspond closely to 
actual transaction prices. The major divergences between 
quotes and actual prices seem most likely to occur at times of 
large, rapid price movements. During the sample period, 
these divergences often occurred at times of macroeconomic 
data announcements from the United States, which tended to 
happen at 8:30 a.m., before the exchange rate data used here 
begin. Recent research by Danielsson and Payne (1999) finds 
that quotes may differ from actual transaction prices in other, 
potentially important ways. This point is discussed in greater 
detail below.
The construction of the exchange rate data set was driven 
primarily by the need to capture as closely as possible the price 
sequence that would be observed by traders operating in the 
market. This explains why an interval of one minute was 
selected, rather than the more common interval of five minutes 
(for example, see Andersen and Bollerslev [1998]). It also 
explains why prices were not taken as an average of the 
immediately preceding and following quotes, another 
common technique in the literature (for example, see Andersen 
and Bollerslev [1998]): traders operating in real time could not 
know the immediately following quote.
The starting time for the data was chosen as 9 a.m. 
New York time for two reasons. First, by 9 a.m., the support 
and resistance levels in the data set have been transmitted to 
customers, including those from New York firms. Second, 
by 9 a.m., the reaction to macroeconomic data announcements 
from all the countries involved—including the United States, 
where, as noted, major announcements generally occurred at 
8:30 a.m. New York time—would largely be over (see Andersen 
and Bollerslev [1998]). 
The data end at 4 p.m. because very little trading takes place 
between then and the beginning of the next trading day in Asia. 
The 4 p.m. cutoff was also chosen because, in the underlying 
tick-by-tick exchange rate data set, quotes are not captured 
after 4 p.m. on Fridays.
Some Definitions
The exchange rate was defined as hitting a support (resistance) 
level if the bid (ask) price fell (rose) to within 0.01 percent of 
that level (see the chart for an illustration). Because the 0.01 
percent figure is somewhat arbitrary, more than one definition 
was tried: the gap was also set at 0.00 percent and 0.02 percent 
in alternative tests. A trend interruption was defined as follows: 
once the exchange rate hit a support (resistance) level, the trend 
was interrupted if the bid (ask) price exceeded (fell short of) the 
support (resistance) level fifteen minutes later. Since the cutoff 
at fifteen minutes is also somewhat arbitrary, an alternative of 
thirty minutes was examined as well. 
For brevity, a trend interruption will be referred to fre-
quently as a “bounce,” and the ratio of times the exchange rate 
bounces to the number of actual hits will be referred to as the 
“bounce frequency.” In formal terms, the goal of the test 
described below is to ascertain statistically whether the bounce 
frequencies for the published support and resistance levels are 
high, as claimed by technical analysts.
Statistical Methodology
The statistical test evaluates whether or not published support 
and resistance levels are able to identify points of likely trend 
interruptions, as claimed by technical analysts. The central or 
“null” hypothesis is that the published levels have no special 
ability to identify such points. I begin with a summary of the 
methodology and then present details.
The construction of the exchange rate data 
set was driven primarily by the need to 
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Summary
The statistical methodology used to test this null hypothesis is 
a specific application of the bootstrap technique (Efron 1979, 
1982). To apply this technique, I first calculate bounce fre-
quencies for each firm for each month in the sample. I then 
build a statistical representation of what bounce frequencies 
for the published support and resistance levels would look like 
if the null hypothesis were true. In the present context, this 
representation is constructed by first creating 10,000 sets of 
artificial support and resistance levels for each day. For each of 
these artificial sets of support and resistance levels, I then 
calculate bounce frequencies for each month, using the criteria 
for hits and bounces listed above. 
At this point, I have twenty-eight bounce frequencies for 
each firm, one for each month of the sample, and twenty-eight 
average bounce frequencies for the artificial support and 
resistance levels. In the final step of the test, I determine the 
number of months in which the bounce frequency for a given 
firm exceeds the average bounce frequency for artificial levels. 
If this number of months is quite high, I conclude that the 
published support and resistance levels have some ability to 
predict intraday trend interruptions. Additional details on this 
methodology are presented below.
Calculating Artificial Support 
and Resistance Levels
For each day, the artificial support and resistance levels are 
chosen at random from exchange rates within a certain range 
of the day’s opening rate. The range for each month is based on 
the exchange rate’s actual behavior, as follows: for a given 
month, I calculate the gap between the opening rate and 
intraday highs and lows for each day. The absolute value of the 
largest of these gaps is used as the range for calculating artificial 
support and resistance levels for that month. 
For each day, twenty artificial support and twenty artificial 
resistance levels are calculated using the following algorithm:
,
.
Here,   represents time,   is the ith artificial support 
(resistance) level,   is the day’s opening rate,   and   are 
random numbers generated from a uniform distribution over 
[0,1], and   is the range for that month. These levels are 
then rounded off so that they have the same number of 
significant digits to the right of the decimal point as actual 
quoted exchange rates.3
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The statistical test is based on comparing the bounce 
frequencies for the published support and resistance levels (BP) 
with the average bounce frequencies for the artificial levels 
(BA), month by month. To understand the test intuitively, 
suppose published support and resistance levels provide no 
more information than arbitrary levels. In this case, BP should 
not consistently be higher or lower than BA. However, if 
published support and resistance levels can predict points of 
likely trend interruptions, as claimed by technical analysts, 
then BP should usually be higher than BA.
This idea can be formalized into a rigorous statistical test. 
The comparison for each month can be viewed as a “Bernoulli 
trial,” in which a random event occurs with a certain proba-
bility. The random event here would be BP > BA. Under the 
null hypothesis that published levels have no special predictive 
power, the likelihood of that event is 50 percent. Over the 
entire twenty-eight-month sample, if it is true that published 
levels are not informative, the chance that BP > BA for any given 
number of months will conform to the binomial distribution. 
This distribution is symmetrical around a single peak at 
fourteen months, where the probability is about 15 percent.
To understand how to use this distribution, suppose we find 
that BP > BA in twenty of the twenty-eight months of the 
sample. We might naturally ask: Would it be unusual to get 
such an extreme outcome if the published levels are truly not 
informative? More concretely, what is the likelihood, if the 
published levels are not informative, of finding BP > BA in 
twenty or more of the twenty-eight months of the sample? This 
likelihood is the area under the tail of the distribution to the 
right of the number 20. This is a very small number: in fact, it 
is 1.8 percent.
The likelihood of finding BP > BA in twenty or more of the 
twenty-eight months, under the assumption that published 
levels are not informative, is called the “marginal significance 
level” associated with the number 20.4 If the marginal 
significance level of some result is smaller than 5 percent, it is 
consistent with standard practice in the literature to conclude 
Consistent with the market’s conventional 
wisdom, exchange rates bounced quite a bit 
more frequently after hitting published 
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that the published numbers are better than arbitrary numbers 
at predicting trend interruptions. Such a result is said to be 
“statistically significant.”
To summarize our example: it would be extremely unusual 
to find that BP > BA in twenty or more of the twenty-eight 
months if the published support and resistance levels were truly 
not informative. In fact, we would realize such an outcome only 
1.8 percent of the time. Since 1.8 percent falls below the 
common critical value of 5 percent, we would conclude that the 
predictive power of the published levels exceeds that of the 
arbitrary levels to a statistically significant degree.
Results
Consistent with the market’s conventional wisdom, exchange 
rates bounced quite a bit more frequently after hitting 
published support and resistance levels than they would have 
by chance. Exchange rates bounced off arbitrary support and 
resistance levels 56.2 percent of the time on average.5 By 
contrast, they bounced off the published levels 60.8 percent of 
the time on average (Table 8). Looking more closely, we find 
that in all sixteen firm-currency pairs, average bounce fre-
quencies for published levels (across the entire sample period) 
exceeded average bounce frequencies for artificial levels.
The month-by-month breakdown shows that for most 
firm-currency pairs bounce frequencies for the published levels 
exceeded average bounce frequencies for artificial levels in 
twenty or more months. As noted above, these outcomes 
would be extremely unlikely if the support and resistance levels 
were truly not informative. More rigorously, the marginal 
significance levels indicate that the results are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level for all but three firm-currency pairs.
The firms’ ability to predict turning points in intraday 
trends seems to have been stronger for the yen and weaker 
for the mark and the pound. On average, bounce frequencies 
for published support and resistance levels exceeded those 
for arbitrary levels by 4.2 percentage points for the mark, 
5.6 percentage points for the yen, and 4.0 percentage points 
for the pound. This relative ranking was maintained fairly 
consistently for individual firms.
Although all six firms seem to have the ability to predict 
exchange rate bounces, their performance varied considerably. 
The bounce frequencies of the best and worst firms differ by 
4.0 percentage points on average. At one extreme, Firm 1’s 
support and resistance levels for the yen had a bounce 
frequency 9.2 percentage points higher than that of the 
arbitrary levels.
Differences across firms are evaluated statistically in Table 9. 
Firm 1 is clearly the best overall: it had the highest bounce 
frequency for two of the three currencies and the second-
highest bounce frequency for the third currency. Furthermore, 
the differences between Firm 1 and the other firms are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in seven of the 
thirteen possible firm-to-firm comparisons and are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level in another comparison. Firm 5 
did quite well for the mark, but did not do noticeably well for 
the other two currencies. No firm was consistently worst.
   
Table 8
Ability of Support and Resistance Levels to Predict 
Interruptions of Intraday Exchange Rate Trends
Artificial 
Levels
Levels Published by Firm                  ..
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Notes: The table compares the ability of published support and resistance 
levels to predict intraday trend interruptions with the distribution of 
predictive ability for 10,000 sets of arbitrary support and resistance levels. 
The measure of predictive ability is based on the “bounce frequency,” or the 
number of times the exchange rate stopped trending after reaching 
support or resistance levels compared with the total number of times the 
rate actually reached such levels. 
The table shows the bounce frequency for published and artificial 
support and resistance levels, the number of hits, the number of months in 
which the bounce frequency for published levels (BP) exceeds the bounce 
frequency for artificial levels (BA), and the marginal significance of this 
number of months under the null hypothesis that published support and 
resistance levels are not informative. “Total months” varies across firms and 
currencies because occasionally a firm contributed too few support and 
resistance levels to have any hits at all.62 Support for Resistance
Robustness
These results are robust to changes in the test methodology.6 
They are not changed qualitatively if a hit is defined more 
broadly or more narrowly (as described earlier) or if one looks 
thirty minutes rather than fifteen minutes beyond a hit. The 
results are also unchanged if one splits the sample into morning 
and afternoon sessions (where the morning session is defined 
to include positions entered before noon).
Interestingly, the results change somewhat if the sample is 
split in half chronologically. During the first half of the sample 
period, when volatility was fairly low by historical standards, 
bounce frequencies were statistically significant for published 
levels in all but one case. In the second half, when volatility 
returned to more normal levels, firms’ bounce frequencies still 
exceeded those for the artificial levels, but the differences 
were no longer statistically significant in half the cases.7 This 
outcome is consistent with the market’s conventional wisdom 
that rates tend to “range trade” in periods of low volatility, thus 
making this type of trend reversal more common.
Quotes versus Transaction Prices
At this point, it is possible to discuss more fully the potential 
implications of the differences noted by Danielsson and Payne 
(1999) between exchange rate quotes and actual transaction 
prices. The first important difference they note is that quotes 
tend to be more volatile than actual transaction prices. This 
should not be critical here, because these results concern the 
direction of price changes, not their magnitude.
Second, Danielsson and Payne (1999) find that quotes tend 
to be negatively autocorrelated while transaction prices are not. 
In theory, this could affect the absolute frequency of bounces 
presented in Table 8. Fortunately, the important qualitative 
conclusions of the paper are based on the difference between 
bounce frequencies for published and simulated levels, rather 
than the absolute size of those bounce frequencies. Further-
more, the negative autocorrelation in quote data may largely 
have dissipated by the end of the fifteen-minute horizon of 
interest. The reason is that if the exchange rate is required to 
reach the actual level rather than some nearby level to achieve 
a hit, bounce frequencies in the simulated support and 
resistance levels fall slightly short of 50 percent. If negative 
autocorrelation at the fifteen-minute horizon were an issue, 
that proportion would presumably exceed 50 percent.
Duration of Predictive Power 
Could an analyst using support and resistance levels published 
today have any success predicting intraday trend reversals one 
week from today? The answer seems to be yes. Five days after 
Table 9
Differences in Firms’ Ability to Predict 
Exchange Rate Bounces
Firm A
Firm B 1 2 3 4 5
German mark
23 . 5 * * *
32 . 1 * * * -1.4***
41 . 5 *** -2.0*** -0.6***
5 -2.0*** -5.5*** -4.1*** -3.5*
60 . 8 *** -2.7*** -1.3*** -0.7* 2.8*
Japanese yen
22 . 8 * **
3 4.1*** 1.3***
4 5.7*** 2.9*** 1.6***
54 . 9 *** 2.0*** 0.7*** -0.9*
63 . 8 *** 1.0*** -0.3*** -1.9* -1.0*
British pound
24 . 2 * * *
33 . 5 * * * -0.8***
53 . 1 * ** -1.2*** -0.4***
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The table compares different firms’ ability to predict intraday trend 
interruptions in exchange rates. The measure of predictive ability is based 
on the “bounce frequency,” or the number of times the exchange rate 
stopped trending after reaching support or resistance levels compared 
with the total number of times the rate actually reached such levels. The 
table presents the difference between bounce frequencies (measured as 
Firm A minus Firm B).
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Could an analyst using support and 
resistance levels published today have any 
success predicting intraday trend reversals 
one week from today? 
The answer seems to be yes.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 63
their publication, bounce frequencies for our six firms still 
exceeded those from arbitrary levels for all firms and cur-
rencies, and the differences were statistically significant in nine 
of the sixteen cases (Table 10). Not surprisingly, the published 
levels were not quite as useful at predicting intraday trend 
reversals five days after publication as they were on their actual 
publication day. On average, five days after publication, rates 
bounced at published levels 1.7 percentage points less 
frequently than they did on the actual publication day.8
The Power of Agreement 
If many analysts agree that a particular level is likely to be 
important, does this imply that the level is more likely than 
others to be important? I addressed this question by comparing 
the predictive power of support and resistance levels provided 
by more than one firm (“agreed levels”) on a given day with the 
predictive power of support and resistance levels provided by 
only one firm.
As shown in Table 11, the bounce frequencies associated 
with agreed levels are quite close to the bounce frequencies 
associated with levels provided by just one firm. Although the 
agreed levels tend to have higher bounce frequencies, the 
differences are generally not statistically significant. The one 
difference found to be statistically significant implies that 
agreed levels have less predictive power than other levels. 
Overall, these results suggest that, if agreed levels do provide 
additional predictive power, the benefit is too small to be of 
much practical importance.9
Table 10
Ability of Support and Resistance Levels to Predict 
Interruptions of Intraday Exchange Rate Trends 
after Five Trading Days
Artificial 
Levels
Levels Published by Firm                  ..
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Notes: The table shows the results of using published support and resistance 
levels to predict intraday trend interruptions five business days after the 
levels’ publication date. The measure of predictive ability is based on the 
“bounce frequency,” or the number of times the exchange rate stopped 
trending after reaching support or resistance levels compared with the total 
number of times the rate actually reached such levels. 
The table shows the bounce frequency for published and artificial 
support and resistance levels, the number of hits, the number of months in 
which the bounce frequency for published levels (BP) exceeds the bounce 
frequency for artificial levels (BA), and the marginal significance of this 
number of months under the null hypothesis that published support and 
resistance levels are not informative. “Total months” varies across firms and 
currencies because occasionally a firm contributed too few support and 
resistance levels to have any hits at all.
Table 11
Is There Power in Agreement?













Agreed levels 58.0 65.9 63.1 59.1 65.2 61.7
Other levels 59.0 63.7 60.6 58.6 63.5 60.3
Months
  agreed >
  other /total
   months 10/28 15/27 17/28 11/28 14/27 14/28
Marginal 
  significance 0.96 0.35 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.57
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The table compares the predictive ability of support and resistance 
levels on which two or more firms agree (“agreed levels”) with the pre-
dictive ability of support and resistance levels provided by only one firm. 
The measure of predictive ability is based on the “bounce frequency,” or the 
number of times the exchange rate stopped trending after reaching support 
or resistance levels compared with the total number of times the rate 
actually reached such levels. If agreed levels were better able to predict intra-
day trend interruptions, the numbers would be positive and statistically 
significant. Two levels were in “narrow agreement” if they were within 
2 points of each other; they were in “broad agreement” if they were within 
5 points of each other. 64 Support for Resistance
Reliability of Estimated “Strengths”
Three of the firms regularly provided estimates of the 
“strength” of their published support and resistance levels. 
For example, levels could be categorized as having strength 
numbers “1,” “2,” or “3,” with 3 being the strongest. The 
strength of a particular level can be interpreted as a crude 
measure of the likelihood that an exchange rate that arrives 
at the level will actually bounce off it.
Were the estimated strengths of support and resistance 
levels meaningful? To answer this question, I examined the 
relative frequency of bounces off support and resistance levels 
in three strength categories: (1) least strong, (2) somewhat 
strong, and (3) strongest. Unfortunately, in many months 
there were few observations in strength category 3, so the only 
reliable comparison was between categories 1 and 2.
Results for this comparison are shown in Table 12, where 
the reported differences would be positive and statistically 
significant if the strength categories were meaningful. In fact, 
the reported strength levels seem to have no consistent 
correspondence with the actual frequency with which exchange 
rates bounced off support and resistance levels. All but two of 
the differences are negative, and the three that are statistically 
significant are negative. In short, published estimates of the 
strength of the levels do not seem to be useful.
Conclusion
This article has examined the predictive power of support and 
resistance levels for intraday exchange rates, using technical 
signals published by six active market participants from 
January 1996 through March 1998. The statistical tests, which 
use the bootstrap technique (Efron 1979, 1982), cover support 
and resistance levels for three currency pairs: dollar-mark, 
dollar-yen, and dollar-pound.
The results indicate that intraday exchange rate trends 
were interrupted at published support and resistance levels 
substantially more often than would have occurred had the 
levels been arbitrarily chosen. This finding is consistent across 
all three exchange rates and across all six firms studied. The 
predictive power of published support and resistance levels 
varies considerably across firms and across exchange rates. 
It lasts at least one week. The strength estimates published 
with the levels are not meaningful. These results are highly 
statistically significant and are robust to alternative 
parameterizations.
The predictive power of support and resistance levels has 
many possible sources, some of which are discussed in Osler 
(2000). Central bank intervention has been cited as a possible 
source of the predictive power of other technical trading 
strategies (Szakmary and Mathur 1997; LeBaron 1999). 
However, central bank intervention seems unlikely to be an 
important source of the predictive power of support and 
resistance levels since there was no reported intervention for 
the mark and the pound during the sample period. Other 
possible explanations include clustered order flow, which 
receives support in Osler (2000), and self-fulfilling 
prophecies.
Table 12
The Meaning of Reported Strength Ratings
Comparison of 
Strengths 1 and 2 German Mark Japanese Yen British Pound
Firm 1 -2.3** -4.1*** -6.5
10/27) 8/26 12/28
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.17)
Firm 2 -2.7** -5.5 -3.9*
10/27) 10/25 10/26
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.08)




Notes: The table evaluates whether support and resistance levels con-
sidered somewhat strong by their publishers actually predict intraday 
trend interruptions better than those considered least strong. The measure 
of predictive ability is based on the “bounce frequency,” or the number of 
times the exchange rate stopped trending after reaching support or 
resistance levels compared with the total number of times the rate actually 
reached such levels. Strength 1 corresponds to the support and resistance 
levels at which trend interruptions are least likely; strength 2 corresponds 
to support and resistance levels at which trend interruptions are more—
but not most—likely. 
       For each firm listed on the left side of the table, the first row of  
numbers represents the difference between the predictive ability of 
support and resistance levels of the two different strengths. If the reported 
strength levels were reliable, then the numbers would be positive and 
significant. The first number in each second row represents the months in 
which the bounce frequency for strength 2 actually exceeded the bounce 
frequency for strength 1; the second number in each row (following the 
slash) represents the number of months in which the comparison was 
valid; the third row of numbers gives the marginal significance of the 
second row under the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the two sets of numbers.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 65
The ability of support and resistance levels to predict trend 
reversals suggests that the intraday currency markets may not 
be fully efficient. To investigate this possibility, it would be 
natural to examine whether traders could profit from these 
predictable bounces on a fairly consistent basis. If it were 
indeed profitable to trade on these readily available technical 
signals, there would seem to be some incentive for rational 
traders to trade the profits away. This would be an appropriate 
subject for future research. It might also be appropriate to 
examine the claim of technical analysts that trends typically are 
sustained once support and resistance levels are “decisively” 
crossed.Endnotes
66 Support for Resistance
1. Support and resistance levels are related to but not identical to 
trading ranges. A trading range has just one support level and one 
resistance level. The firms examined here usually provided multiple 
support levels and multiple resistance levels each day.
2. These results are available from the author upon request.
3. That is, all artificial support and resistance levels for the mark and 
the pound had the form x.xxxx00, while all artificial support and 
resistance levels for the yen had the form xxx.xx00000.
4. For some firms, there were few support and resistance levels in some 
months, and thus few hits and bounces. These months were excluded 
from the sample for those firms.
5. If intraday exchange rates followed a random walk, the tendency to 
bounce would, in the abstract, be about 50 percent. The tendency to 
bounce in the actual data exceeds this benchmark for two reasons. 
First, changes in the actual and the simulated data have a fairly strong 
negative first-order autocorrelation, as noted by Goodhart and 
Figliuoli (1991). Second, to “bounce,” the exchange rate must first 
reach a level a little above (below) the actual support (resistance) level, 
and then remain above (below) the actual support (resistance) level 
for a certain interval. Thus, the exchange rate can continue trending 
slightly after officially hitting the level yet still be considered as having 
“bounced.”
6. Results from these sensitivity tests are available from the author 
upon request.
7. The standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes rose by one-
third on average between the first and second halves of the sample 
period. In the first half, these standard deviations were 0.199, 0.216, 
and 0.260 for the mark, yen, and pound, respectively. In the second 
half, the corresponding standard deviations were 0.252, 0.362, and 
0.277 (all figures E+3).
8. The reader may also be interested to know whether the tendency of 
support and resistance levels to be selected as round numbers or as 
local highs/lows has any influence on the levels’ predictive power. In 
Osler (2000), I examine whether round numbers or local minima/
maxima (both of which are known to be sources of published support 
and resistance levels) have predictive power for exchange rate 
bounces. I find that they do, from which I conclude that at least some 
of the predictive power in the published levels comes from the firms’ 
tendency to choose these types of numbers. I also show that the size of 
the typical move following a hit differs substantially between the 
published levels of some firms and the artificial levels. I conclude from 
this that round numbers and local minima/maxima do not 
incorporate as much information about intraday trend reversals as do 
some published support and resistance levels.
9. It would be desirable here to weight the advising firms by their order 
flow. However, order information is very closely guarded by the firms 
in question. Furthermore, some of the firms do not actually take 
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